Sharing Profits to Reduce Inefficient Separations
Abstract
This study argues that firms can use profit sharing to raise profits by reducing the risk for inefficient separations by the workers. It is based on the idea of Hall and Lazear (1984) and clarifies their analysis of fixed wage contracts in employment relations of fixed length. It extends their analysis to continuing employment relationships in which the base wage is exogenously given but the firm can unilaterally set a profit sharing parameter. It is argued that the use of down payments, on which the analysis of Hall and Lazear is based, is not possible with continuing employment relationships. Instead the bargaining power will be reflected in the base wage. This reduces the possibilities to adjust the base wage to reduce inefficient separations and may increase the importance of profit sharing. The intuitive positive dependence of the profit sharing parameter on the covariance between the value of the worker’s outside option and his productivity in the firm does not necessarily hold.
- ISSN: 1457-2923
- ISBN: 952-5071-70-7
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