


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TYÖPAPEREITA / WORKING PAPERS

# The TikTok factor: Young voters and the support for the populist right

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**ABSTRACT**

Young voters' electoral behavior has been a particular target of interest because young people waver between apolitical and radical attitudes and the formally dominant main-stream parties suffer from this the most. We examine possible explanations into why this shift away from main-stream parties is happening by a conjoint survey experiment that tested for possible differences in policy preferences between young people aged 15 –29 and adults aged 30 – 79. We also survey the respondents' media consumption habits, political sophistication, and trust in institutions. Results show that even though young people in Finland show no differences on average in policy preferences when compared to

adults, they were systematically more in favor of voting for the populist extreme right. This difference is likely to stem from the young men who have less trust in institutions and less political sophistication than adults and an increased likelihood to get their political information from TikTok.

**Keywords:**

**TikTok, young voters, political communication, policy preferences, political socialization**

**TIIVISTELMÄ**

**TikTokin merkitys vaaleissa:  
nuoret äänestäjät ja populistisen  
oikeiston kannatus**

Nuorten äänestyskäyttäytyminen on ollut erityisen kiinnostuksen kohteena. Osaa nuorista politiikka ei kiinnosta lainkaan ja toisaalta osalla on radikaaleja poliittisia kantoja. Tämä heikentää erityisesti perinteisiä vallassa olevia puolueita. Tutkimme mahdollisia selityksiä tälle perinteisistä puolueista etäänäntymiselle käyttämällä ns. satunnaistettua yhdistelmäkyselykoetta (conjoint survey experiment), jossa tarkasteltiin nuorten (15-29-vuotiaat) ja aikuisten (30-79-vuotiaat) välisiä eroja poliittisissa asenteissa. Lisäksi kartoitimme vastaajien mediankulutustottumuksia, kiinnostusta politiikkaan sekä luottamusta instituutioihin. Tulokset osoittavat, että vaikka nuorten ja aikuisten välillä ei keskimäärin havaittu eroja mieltymyksissä yhteiskuntapoliittisten toimien suhteen, nuoret olivat järjestelmällisesti taipuvaisempia äänestämään populistista äärioikeistoa. Tämä ero näyttäisi juontuvan erityisesti nuorista miehistä, joilla on alhaisempi

luottamus instituutioihin, vähäisempi kiinnostus politiikkaan verrattuna aikuisiin sekä suurempi taipumus hankkia poliittista tietoa TikTok-alustalta.

**Avainsanat:**

**TikTok, nuoret äänestäjät,  
poliittinen viestintä,  
poliittiset mieltymykset,  
poliittinen sosialisatio**

# 1 Introduction

The 2024 European elections showed that across countries, the populist right was the preferred party of choice among the youngest voters, especially among young men.<sup>1</sup> Decades-long observations about young people's low turnout rates is being challenged by recent increases in political interest and turnout among the youth.<sup>2</sup> However, the reasons for this recent surge in youth participation in politics and especially the boost they gave to the right rather than to the Greens like in previous elections remain unclear. Media commentators have raised by and large two explanations: on the one hand young people are portrayed as having fears and anxieties about the state of domestic and world politics, and thus, having anti-establishment sentiments, and on the other hand they are portrayed as the TikTok generation that has bought into the simplistic, entertaining messages spread mainly by the populist right on TikTok.<sup>3</sup>

In the latest Romanian presidential elections in November 2024 the ultra-nationalist, pro-Russia Calin Georgescu delivered a big surprise by qualifying first to the second round with no party of his own and by campaigning largely on TikTok, appearing from obscurity and gaining large political visibility on the platform in a matter of a few months. Romanian media called it "the Russian invasion of Romanian politics"<sup>4</sup> and members of the European Parliament demanded TikTok's CEO to explain its interference in politics<sup>5</sup>.

TikTok is an increasing factor in explaining election outcomes, especially when it comes to the populist right in Europe. In addition to party entrepreneurs, the possibility of

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-young-people-right-wing-voters-far-right-politics-eu-elections-parliament/>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/how-young-voters-could-again-drive-eu-election-turnout>

<sup>3</sup><https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqqq952e3v6o>

<sup>4</sup><https://adevarul.ro/alegeri-prezidentiale-2024/cristian-tudor-popescu-a-inceput-invadarea-2404039.html>

<sup>5</sup><https://www.antena3.ro/politica/alegeri-prezidentiale-2024/seful-tiktok-este-somata-dea-explicatii-in-pe-despre-campania-lui-calin-georgescu-suntem-martorii-unui-atac-impotriva-democratiei-728816.html>

misinformation is repeatedly raised in connection with TikTok.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, as a recent article on Vox puts it<sup>7</sup>, TikTok might be breaking young voters' brains with the sheer cacophony of information rather than steer them in a given direction.

Another factor to take into account with the advent of the new type of algorithm-driven social media is that studies are showing a decline in political trust among young voters. (Chevalier, 2019). This means that at the same time as young people are increasingly distrustful of official institutions and the establishment, they might be increasingly caving into their algorithm-fed echochambers to form and maintain their political opinions.

All in all, these pessimistic readings of the youngest generations of voters sidelining classical political institutions for doing or foregoing politics in online echo-chambers has been a continuous source of debate and research since the advent of the internet (Zhuravskaya et al., 2020). However, what is typical about TikTok is its algorithm-driven nature which exposes the user to content from strangers, thus exposing the user to content creators whom the user otherwise would not have followed. This feature can be hypothesized to either radicalize or open new horizons to users in a way that makes it a very interesting and fertile ground for political entrepreneurs. However, due to the ongoing security doubts about TikTok's Chinese origins and mainstream parties' reluctance to engage with it, not all parties are universally represented on TikTok. Therefore, whoever is present on TikTok and survives its fight for instantaneous attention has possible major political gains. (Umansky and Pipal, 2023).

But is TikTok really a no man's land where politically unsophisticated users fall for whatever the algorithm feeds them? Is the observed relationship between populist right support just the result of the the populist right being present on TikTok at the right time before other political actors discovered it? Or is it possibly a coincidence with young people already having systematically different policy preferences from older voters? As young people are not only portrayed in the media as avid TikTokers but also as political actors

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<sup>6</sup><https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/oct/24/tiktok-election-misinformation-voting-politics>

<sup>7</sup><https://www.vox.com/353689/is-tiktok-breaking-young-voters-brains>

who are worried about issues such as climate change, a possibility of a third world war, uncontrolled immigration, and rising living costs, it might be rather that the use of TikTok just coincides with an increased appetite for new parties proposing new solutions to problems that mainstream parties might be staying quite about.

To this end this paper investigates this issue with a two-fold strategy. On one hand we check for systematic differences between young people's and adult voters' policy preferences with a conjoint survey experiment, where both young people and older people were presented with different parties that presented differing policy packages. Respondents were asked to repeatedly choose between different options to see what policies are favored by younger and older people. To compliment this, we also designed a survey which inquired about the respondent' political behavior and attitudes, including how they would vote in the upcoming 2023 Finnish parliamentary elections, if the respondent was a user of TikTok, trusted institutions and where they would place themselves across left/right and liberal/conservative scales.

Results suggest that there are no overall differences between young and adult voters' policy preferences, nor can we say that young people would be on the whole more right wing and conservative than adult voters. If anything, on average young people are more liberal and value progressive than adult voters, with the exception of the youngest of the younger voters, who are more anti-immigration than older voters. However, the intention to vote for the populist right Finns' Party in the the 2023 parliamentary election was clearly higher among young voters on average than older voters and driven by young men. The major differences between young and adult respondents was that young people reported higher usage of TikTok rather than other forms of media, and lower institutional and political trust than adults, and these factors also predict voting for the Finns' Party. The young also had lower propensity to discuss politics with other people than adults. We also conclude that in spite of increasing talk about the youth no longer caring about traditional left/right divides, the left/right divide is still a powerful predictor of policy preferences, as well as gender, with

men being more likely to support rightist and conservative ideas.

All in all, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that TikTok benefits the populist right and that the populist right has managed to tap into young people's political dissatisfaction and alienation. This is not necessarily expressed in differing policy stances, but rather as a general distrust of the establishment. However, more future research is needed to address possible reverse causation, namely figuring out if TikTok attracts certain kind of people prone to the consumption of right-wing content or if we can talk of a TikTok "net effect" among its users.

## 2 Previous literature and theoretical expectations

### 2.1 Scholarly and mediatic observations on TikTok

A gap regarding research on the much-reported and hypothesized political influence of TikTok on young voters is that TikTok being such a recent phenomenon, there is relatively little academic knowledge on it. Much of what we can hypothesize about its effects on young people's voting behavior comes from general research about the effects of the internet and social media on voting behavior.

In their review piece about the political effects of internet and social media [Zhuravskaya et al. \(2020\)](#) note that whereas in the early days of the internet, internet usage was associated with a *decrease* in turnout, due to people finding alternative political participation ways than voting by spending their time online, by the 2010s this trend was reversed and instead was replaced by a tendency to adopt anti-establishment views and political polarization. Several studies have confirmed this relationship between political and affective polarization online, although reverse causality might be an issue: people prone to polarization might self-select to spend more time online. This is supported by [Nordbrandt \(2021\)](#), who claims that it is the level of affective polarization that affected subsequent use of social media. On other words polarization does not happen online, but precedes it.

Neither of these two studies deal with TikTok, which is a relatively recent addition to the social media landscape. The novelty of the app was that whereas at the time of its launch in 2016 other existing social media platforms required the existence of some list of people to follow in order to fill one's news feed, in TikTok one's news feed is curated by an algorithm that seeks to predict what the user of the app would likely engage with.

In a pioneering study on the political effects of TikTok among young adults in the US, Church (2022) shows that TikTok, like any other social media thus far, can have a sizable effect on a young person's political identity. However, in this study it was not clear in which direction this shift would go, as users experienced shifts in both liberal and conservative directions: while half of the sample's registered Democrats indicated they had become more liberal during their TikTok use, 40 percent said they had grown more conservative. Similarly, among Republicans, 57 percent reported getting more conservative, while 40 percent said they had become more liberal.

A more recent study also conducted in the US (Karimi and Fox, 2023) suggests that like other forms of online behavior, TikTok creates echochambers in which people only reinforce their pre-existing ideas as a result of a tailored news feed that builds on their past searches. On the whole, TikTok users were liberal, but those who identified as Republicans only increased in their support for Donald Trump. However, by and large, the study showed a liberal slant among the users of all social media: the more time respondents spend on social media the more likely they were to be supportive of liberal politicians. The liberal slant was especially significant for TikTok users, who reported higher levels of support for liberal politicians and these findings were true regardless of whether respondents identified as Democrats. TikTok usage was also associated with an increased worry about racial injustice whereas this was not present for other social media apps. This is not surprising given that George Floyd's death was much commented on TikTok and TikTok served as hub for activism related to the Black Lives Matter movement.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup><https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/04/politics/tik-tok-black-lives-matter/index.html>



To sum up, in the US by and large liberal people end up on TikTok and TikTok only reinforces their liberal ideas, whereas those who are conservative, only reinforce their conservative beliefs on TikTok, but they are a minority on TikTok. However, this liberal slant on TikTok might be due to the reluctance of Republicans to be present on TikTok due to its possible links to spying for China, (Umansky and Pipal, 2023) whereas on the Democrats' side it boasts such prominent figures as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who has clearly understood the visual communication style that attracts young voters. In their study about the way politicians use TikTok in the US, Umansky and Pipal (2023) report that at the time of writing the paper in April 2023 all politicians who use TikTok are members of the Democratic party, with no publicly available TikTok accounts by Republican politicians.

Karimi and Fox (2023) also find that TikTok fosters both online political behavior in the form of sharing and commenting on political news and following a politician *and* offline political behavior such as voting, making a donation and volunteering for a cause. Importantly, of all social media platforms only TikTok and Twitter showed this association. In conclusion, the political talk on TikTok also seems to translate into political action. However, the direction of this action might very much depend on who the content creators are that mobilize people into both formulating polarized ideas and also acting upon them.

There is less research on the effects of TikTok on European political behavior but a recent study in Germany (Classen et al., 2024) analyzes with qualitative content analysis the communication style of the populist right AfD which, much more so than other political parties, has a major presence on TikTok. The party's communication covers topics such as security, anti-establishment attitudes and identity politics. They evoke concerns about general security, such as financial stability, fighting crime, the consequences of war and restrictions on personal freedoms. The authors argue that one could sum up their communication strategy as one fueling existential fears and creating a climate of insecurity.

A final important aspect of TikTok is its content that can be best described as "Infotainment". Even important topics are often presented in a personal, light, and even in a

comedic aspect, rather than as serious news. In their analysis of what types of political videos enjoy success on TikTok, [Umansky and Pival \(2023\)](#) show that comedic videos enjoy more engagement than serious videos and that surprisingly, this effect is especially pronounced for women. A politician seeking to do well on TikTok thus has to learn the new, more lighthearted, personal, and quick-paced way of communicating in order to reap the rewards of this platform. The entry costs of learning such a new way, or the lack of natural predisposition for it, might also be therefore reasons for established politicians to stay away from the platform, giving way to a subset of younger and less established politicians.

## **2.2 The political socialization and preferences of young adults**

Although our study is not concerned with overall trends of inter-generational political behavior and cohort analysis, in our attempt to disentangle the reasons behind the current trend of online polarization we need to portray the backdrop of larger trends in political socialization that have been in the making for the past decades. However, it must be stressed that due to lags in publications, most existing academic research on the topic treats Millennials as the younger cohort, whereas for our purposes the young voter generation is mainly Gen Z, which is often defined as people born between 1997 – 2012. More precisely our young voter respondents were aged between 15 – 29 in the year 2023 when the survey was conducted, and thus, born between 1994 – 2008.

Life cycle studies have noted a lag in the maturity of the youth for the past decades, according to which major life decisions such as getting married, having children, and buying property have been postponed for various reasons ([Kohler et al., 2002](#)). This trend toward later maturation negatively affects turnout levels of young citizens and can be linked to the steadily declining turnout that has been observed since the 1970s ([Smets, 2016](#)). In addition to turnout, previous scholarship has noted a steady decline in political participation and trust in institutions overall ([Delli Carpini, 2000](#); [Quintelier, 2007](#)). A further component of political behavior in recent decades has been the 2008 financial crash. Especially our younger

sample has been socialized into politics in this post-recession era, which has been shown to lead to the Gen Z voters being more prone to people-centrism in their party preferences. (Zagórski et al., 2024)

In contrast to this narrative of a steady decline in political participation and trust, a growing literature is stating that instead of being politically apathetic and unsophisticated, the younger voters engage through other forms of participation, which challenge traditional understandings of democratic politics, such as campus politics, pervasive internet use, and fan or "do it yourself" activism (Earl et al., 2017; Pickard, 2022). A cross-European study from nine European countries concluded that the youngest adult group is no less supportive of liberal democracy than older age groups (Fernández Guzmán Grassi et al., 2024). In other words, political participation has not decreased, but has changed in its nature.

Another argument that is often raised in association with younger voters is that they have different policy preferences and vote choices from older voters and that the young are increasingly anti-establishment and polarized. In connection with the 2024 European elections, the media portrayed young European voters as anti-establishment voters concerned about war, increasing rent prices, and immigration,<sup>9</sup> whereas in the 2019 young voters were seen to usher in a "green wave" with their support for Green Parties, which might have been seen as anti-establishment in 2019, but possibly too establishment in 2024.

O'Grady (2023) systematically examines the long-term trends in possible age divides in policy preferences in Europe and finds that there is no evidence that the young and old are becoming increasingly ideologically opposed nor that that young Europeans today are much more socialist than the elderly, or that age divisions over 'woke' issues are wider than in the past. If anything, the young are more opposed to tax and government spending than the elderly. He also finds that today's age divides over social issues and immigration are similar in size to the 1980s and if anything are starting to fall, as the young and middle-aged become more similar. Finally, despite these age gaps, on issues such as LGBT rights and pension

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<sup>9</sup><https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqqq952e3v6o>

spending, majorities of the young and old support the same policies.

But if ideological age gaps are largely unchanged, why have age gaps for voting widened recently with younger voters visibly preferring anti-establishment parties over mainstream parties? According to O’Grady, a likely explanation is that the emergence of new parties with more extreme positions on social issues and immigration over the past 30 years – and more emphatic communication of these stances – has helped the young and old to better express their long-standing non-economic differences when voting. Age divides might appear to have grown due to the actions of parties but in reality young and old voters in Europe are not more polarised than in the past.

This interpretation of generational gaps is supported by [Steiner \(2024\)](#) who shows that for younger voters, traditional political cleavages across left /right divides are shifting, so that whereas for older generations the division lies in attitudes to redistribution, for younger voters the divide lies in attitudes to climate change and immigration. This might be a result of young people being more motivated by ‘newer’ cultural issues like immigration attitudes and Euroscepticism, while older generations hold more steadfast to their traditional political affiliations. ([Gougou and Mayer, 2012](#); [Walczak et al., 2012](#))

On a related note, [Zagórski et al. \(2024\)](#) show that the gap between Gen Z voters and older voters can be explained with the thin/thick populism theory. They show with a conjoint experiment that whereas for older people "thick" elements of populism such as being anti-immigration are determinants in their vote choice, younger voters care more about then "thin" anti-establishment elements of populism, especially in the form of people-centrism.

The dilemma of young people opting more for anti-establishment parties even though young people seem to have similar policy preferences might be also explained by different levels of issue alignment. [Jocker et al. \(2024\)](#) show that issue alignment, voting in accordance with the policy one cares most about, is stronger in younger cohorts than older cohorts. If issues that younger European voters care about are immigration and environmental policies, and less left and right cleavages, their votes will be cast for parties that have formulated clear

messages about these topics.

## 2.3 Context: Finnish political actors on TikTok

As research on TikTok for the time being tends to be based on US data, it is worthwhile diving into the Finnish world of TikTok, as we conducted the survey in Finland. Whereas in the US TikTok has a clear Democratic bias, in Finland, as elsewhere in Europe, the public discourse has associated TikTok mainly with the populist right, and to some extent with some younger environmentalist candidates, who have managed to build up followers and visibility on TikTok. The 2023 parliamentary elections were dubbed the "TikTok elections" in which many younger candidates without big budgets managed to get impressive vote shares through their sheer presence on TikTok. This effect was especially clear for the populist right-wing Finns' Party.<sup>10</sup>

An article published by the Finnish tabloid Iltasanomat<sup>11</sup> ahead of the 2023 Finnish elections, which were only two months ahead from when our data was collected for this study, shows that in contrast to the US, Finnish TikTok is largely dominated by conservative parties. On 31.3.2021 the Finns' party had the most active presence on TikTok with 13 MPs creating content and with 154,196 followers. The next big force on TikTok is the Green party with 106,227 followers and the with 6 active MPs. Interestingly, in terms of active MPs the second, third, and fourth largest parties are the mainstream Center and Social Democratic parties alongside the mainstream right National Coalition, but this presence does not materialize into a large amount of followers (10,922, 5,465, and 4,435 respectively). Interestingly, the third largest party on TikTok is the libertarian Liike Nyt (which describes itself as an alternative to mainstream parties), which only has one MP in the Finnish Parliament.

The article further interviews two successful politicians on TikTok, one from the Finns' Party and one from the Green Party about their communication strategies on TikTok. Both politicians stress the need for authenticity and real dialogue with their followers. Both

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<sup>10</sup><https://yle.fi/a/74-20025628>

<sup>11</sup><https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art-2000009328979.html>

members of parliament felt that TikTok was a place where they could reach their followers and where they could listen to their needs and worries. Both candidates felt the importance of replying themselves to direct messages and creating videos that they felt their followers wanted to see. They also stressed that TikTok should not be seen as a platform for political ads, but as a channel where direct connections could be established with people of all ages and circumstances.

The Finns's MP, Miko Bergbom especially talks about young people as his core constituency, and criticizes the mainstream view that young people are not interested in politics or that they would be only worried about global affairs such as climate change and war. According to Bergbom, young people care about things that matter in their own lives like the price of food in the local grocery store, access to mental health services, and the problem of not being able to afford having to drive 40 kilometers to one's work or hobby.

All in all the Finnish political TikTok scene could be summed up by being dominated by anti-establishment parties and that the success of these parties and their members who are successful on TikTok seems to come from understanding TikTok's personal, sentimental, indirect and often humorous communication style. Once TikTok users are engaged with the political content, it seems to reverberate among its users, who do seem to make use of the easy connectivity that it brings with politicians.

Additionally, it must be noted that the overall trends of young people becoming more suspicious of politics over the past years does not hold in Finland, where, if anything, the trust in the European Union and the judiciary has increased between the years 2002-2022 among the 15-29-year-olds (European Value Surveys). Moreover, the overall trend of turnout among the the 18-24-year-olds (18 being the minimum age for voting) has increased in the past years (Statistics Finland), although this is highly gender and education specific: among young men the turnout is very low compared to other demographics and among the youth with only compulsory education the share of voters has dramatically decreased since the 1980s ([Lahtinen, 2020](#)). Taking into account that Finnish youth political participation and trust

does not fully comply to the more negative international trends, we interpret our subsequent results as a lower bound estimate in international comparison.

## 2.4 Hypothesis building

Based on what is presented above, we can draw the conclusions that young people do seem to be politically active, albeit in different forms from conventional methods. Political activism seems to have moved to great extent online, especially to TikTok, but there they seem to be engaged with politics and that this online activism also translates into votes on ballot day.

Possibly due to the record low levels of political trust among young people, young people seem to forego conventional ways of political activism such as party-level mobilization, petition writing and marches to establishing more direct relationships with their preferred politicians on TikTok. However, it is likely not random who ends up on TikTok, especially from the political supply side, as TikTok seems to suit younger, "online charismatic", and more anti-establishment politicians, although this might depend on the local context.

In terms of policy preferences, the research is divided about young people either being more worried about socio-cultural issues than traditional left-right cleavages or showing strikingly similar preferences to older voters. If the existing literature manages to predict today's younger voters preferences in Europe, they can be expected to be either more libertarian (more supportive of liberal values but more restrictive on taxation and social spending) or have similar policy preferences to older generations. Young people also might be divided between themselves in their policy preferences, but they should portray higher issue congruence than older voters, as in they are also more likely to put a premium on their preferred issue by voting for the party that has a clear stance on this. Crucially, in Europe the political supply on TikTok is largely dominated by the populist right, so younger voters are also more exposed to messages by these parties.

Based on these conclusions we can build the following three hypotheses to sum up the literature:

1. Young voters should be more active on TikTok than adults and pay more attention to political actors on TikTok.
2. Younger people have similar policy preferences as adults but prime socio-cultural values over economic ones.
3. Although policy preferences might be shared, younger voters will be more likely to vote for non-mainstream parties due to a) their stronger presence on TikTok b) due to them having clear stances on the socio-cultural issues that matter to young people.

More specifically, we can test the following hypotheses with our sample and research design:

- *H1: Young people are more active on TikTok than adults.*
- *H2: Young people have similar policy preferences as adults.*
- *H3: Young people who use TikTok vote more for non-mainstream parties than adults and young people who do not use TikTok.*

### 3 Data and research design

Our research is based on the answers to a questionnaire, where we surveyed young people's views on society. By young people we mean people between ages 15-29 and our main sample contains 1069 such respondents. In order to compare views with older age groups, we also collected a small sample of 217 people aged between 30-79 years. For simplicity, we refer to these samples as youth and adults. This definition should be crucial when interpreting the results of the survey so as not to distort our understanding. At the beginning of the survey, we used multiple-choice questions to find out respondents' general social views, their views on the state of society, their use of the media and their educational background. With this information we have combined data on respondents' age, gender, income level and country of residence collected from the survey company's (Taloustutkimus) standard background information on its subject pool.



In the second part of the survey, we used a pre-registered conjoint experiment to investigate respondents' policy preferences for socio-economic issues. Respondents were presented with two hypothetical party platforms (a card pair) and asked to choose which party they would vote for in the upcoming Spring 2023 Parliamentary election. The party platforms showed the same set of different policy measures (attributes) with a limited number of possible values, which were randomized. Policy measures in the programs related to airline tax, retirement age, unemployment benefits, length of the working day, class sizes in primary school, fur farming and labor migration.

The realization of the attribute values was selected by matching each party program shown. For example, a measure related to the retirement age could be that the party would raise the retirement age by two years, keep it the same, or lower it by two years. Because the values of the attributes are randomized, it is possible to make causal inferences about the effect of the value of the attributes on the choice of the alternative [Hainmueller et al. \(2014\)](#). Each respondent was presented with eight pairs of party platforms from which they would choose the party they prefer. We also randomized between-subjects the order that the attributes were shown, but kept the order the same within-subject to minimize cognitive burden of responding.

The advantage of the conjoint method is that it can analyze the impact of several characteristics on the desirability of a target at the same time, rather than trying to analyze, for example, the impact of retirement age policy in isolation from other policy dimensions. This leaves the respondent to weigh up how much he or she values the different attributes in relation to each other. In addition, the method has proven to be more effective than many other survey methods in that it eliminates the tendency of respondents to consciously or unconsciously please the survey organizer with their answers. The effect is based on the fact that when choices are made between sets of attributes, it is not clear which answer would please the researcher ([Horiuchi et al., 2022](#)).

The conjoint experiment data is analyzed by using a single card as the unit of observation.

As each respondent chooses between eight pairs of cards, each respondent provides 16 observations. The dependent variable in the OLS linear probability regressions is a dummy indicating whether the card was chosen or not. Independent variables are dummies indicating a realization of each possible attribute value. The interpretation of the resulting coefficients is the causal effect of a given attribute value on the card being chosen relative to the reference value of that attribute. These are called average marginal component effects (AMCE) (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Given all the attribute values are simultaneously in the regression model, the coefficients should be interpreted as being conditional on all the other attributes. We report the results as coefficient plots with the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval while clustering standard errors at the respondent level.

The survey was conducted in March 2023 in an online environment before the parliamentary elections, and was carried out by the largest Finnish market survey research company Taloustutkimus. The survey sample was formed by a multistage stratified sampling of respondents from their Economic Research Panel. The panel of respondents, in turn, was collected through multiple channels. The samples of young people and adults aim to represent the same age of the Finnish population, excluding the Åland Islands. Before the final survey was carried out, we piloted the survey with activists from the youth organizations of the parliamentary parties. The results of the pilot survey and the comments received were used in the actual survey.

The data is fairly representative in terms of age, gender and location, although those living in inner urban areas are slightly over-represented. In terms of education, primary education is under-represented and tertiary education is over-represented. As some differences between our sample and the population as a whole emerge, they should be borne in mind when considering the generalisability of our results. However, we do not weight the responses in this analysis to ensure representativeness, as the comparison of the characteristics of our data and the population as a whole is ambiguous in terms of educational categories, which would make it difficult to calculate exact weights. The representativeness of the data is

discussed in more detail in the Appendix.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Survey results and descriptive statistics

We begin by empirically examining some claims related to young voters in the media. These claims are that a) young people don't discuss politics as much as adults, that b) they don't trust institutions, c) that they tend to use TikTok more than adults, d) that they identify as more leftist or liberal than adults, and e) that they vote more for anti-establishment parties.

As expected, the youth discuss less politics with close ones (the traditional socialization channel) than adults. Young people also have on average less trust in institutions, use more TikTok and are more likely to vote for the Finns' Party and the Greens than adults, and are less likely to vote for traditional mainstream parties. Young people don't tend to place themselves at either side of the left/right spectrum and while they identify somewhat more as liberal, the mode in their answers is neither liberal or conservative.

Figure 1: Discusses societal issues with close people, for youth and adults






Figure 2: Discusses societal issues with colleagues, for youth and adults




(a) Adults




(b) Youth

Figure 3: Discusses societal issues with acquaintances, for youth and adults



(a) Adults



(b) Youth

Figure 4: Discusses societal issues with unknown people, for youth and adults




Figure 5: Left/right and liberal/conservative axis self-placement for youth and adults




Figure 6: Media usage for youth and adults




Figure 7: Trust in institutions for youth and adults





Figure 8: Voting intentions for youth and adults



The striking factor in these responses is the clear difference in the support for both the Greens and the Finns' Party between the youth and adults. If young people were the only eligible voters, the populist right Finns' Party would be by far the largest party in Finland, followed by the Greens which represents a polar opposite to the Finns' Party. In this sense the polarization of young people seems to be true, and based on the lower levels of political trust and fewer real life political discussions than adults, this indeed might be a result of online activism. To this extent, we move on to inspect to what extent TikTok usage is associated with the vote choice for either of the polarized blocks, the populist right Finns' Party or the combination of the Greens, the Left and the Social Democrats, which we consider the other end of the liberal left political spectrum. We also investigate what predicts usage of TikTok.

In Table 1, we report results from a linear probability model (OLS) that predicts support for the Finns Party. We see that being a TikTok user significantly predicts the vote for the populist right Finns Party with an approximately 10 p.p. magnitude. This large estimate is very robust to including a wealth of other covariates that are also very good at predicting this vote choice. Being male, having low education, lack of trust in politicians, perceiving macroeconomic conditions as poor, having non-ecological, conservative and right orientation all predict Finns' Party voting strongly. Given the striking robustness to such strong predictors, we might be inclined to be somewhat less concerned with the omitted variable bias completely driving the TikTok result.

However, we should be concerned about reverse causality, where TikTok would attract the types of users that go there to get content that matches their Finns' Party preferences. In Table 2, we find that TikTok use is overall associated with being female, having lower education, not living in a large city and perceiving macroeconomic conditions as poor. This implies that TikTok use is predicted by some of the same factors as Finns Party voting but also by different or very opposing characteristics. Interestingly, left-right or liberal-conservative orientation or trust in politicians do not predict TikTok usage. These results suggests that we perhaps should not be overly concerned that TikTok attracts specifically Finn's Party



voters, and thus, perhaps reverse causality is not solely behind our findings that the use of TikTok is positively associated with Finns' Party voting. We return to this argument also when discussing the conjoint experiment results.

In Table 2, we similarly analyze what predicts voting for the Liberal-left block of the Greens Party, the Left Alliance or the Social Democratic Party. Interestingly, TikTok usage does not seem to do so. That is, TikTok in Finland does not seem to enforce all pre-existing political attitudes among the youth, but only the Finns' Party that also seems to have the strongest presence in TikTok. This argument is also supported by being female strongly predicting both TikTok and Liberal-left voting and yet TikTok not predicting liberal-left voting. These gender results also show that political polarization among the youth is also heavily dependent on gender. Young men support the conservative populist right and young women the liberal left. Being disadvantaged and perceiving macroeconomic conditions as good predicts liberal-left voting.

This all goes in line with the macro-analysis of [Gethin et al. \(2021\)](#) who conclude that while economic attitudes still predict vote choice on the left/right axis, the major shift in Western democracies for the past decade is the end of class-based politics and its replacement by education levels, especially among young men, where lack of higher education predicts votes for the right more powerfully than for women. Interestingly, the fear of losing one's social status (subjective perception of being more disadvantaged than the rest) only translates into leftist voting, rather than for the populist right vote. When not conditioning on left and ecological orientation also trust in politicians and other people as well as living in a large city predict liberal-left voting.

Next, we turn to see if the drastic difference between TikTok users versus non-TikTok users, and younger people versus adults in supporting the populist right stems from different policy preferences.

Variables	(1) Finns party voter	(2) Finns party voter	(3) Finns party voter
TikTok user	0.0878*** (0.0275)	0.0981*** (0.0235)	0.0991*** (0.0237)
Sex female		-0.167*** (0.0266)	-0.171*** (0.0270)
College degree or higher		-0.0715*** (0.0243)	-0.0675*** (0.0248)
Left orientation		-0.103*** (0.0254)	-0.104*** (0.0257)
Liberal orientation		-0.154*** (0.0270)	-0.153*** (0.0272)
Ecological orientation		-0.162*** (0.0278)	-0.158*** (0.0282)
Macroeconomic prospects poor		0.176*** (0.0382)	0.174*** (0.0383)
Does not trust politicians		0.119*** (0.0308)	0.114*** (0.0313)
Large city			-0.00302 (0.0245)
Finnish not first language			0.0254 (0.0527)
People can be trusted			-0.0298 (0.0250)
Disadvantaged			-0.00801 (0.0381)
Constant	0.238*** (0.0197)	0.457*** (0.0307)	0.467*** (0.0326)
Observations	1,063	1,063	1,060
R-squared	0.009	0.314	0.316

Table 1: Predicting Finns Party voting.

Note: OLS regressions for the youth sample (15 -29 years) for predicting vote cast for the populist right Finns' Party. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Variables	(1) TikTok user	(2) TikTok user	(3) Liberal-left voter	(4) Liberal-left voter
Sex female	0.120*** (0.0309)	0.140*** (0.0318)	0.232*** (0.0280)	0.107*** (0.0246)
College degree or higher	-0.122*** (0.0341)	-0.116*** (0.0342)	0.0411 (0.0322)	0.0279 (0.0262)
Left orientation		0.0505 (0.0388)		0.499*** (0.0344)
Liberal orientation		-0.0574 (0.0382)		0.0193 (0.0321)
Ecological orientation		-0.0740** (0.0343)		0.196*** (0.0302)
Macroeconomy prospects poor	-0.109** (0.0426)	-0.119*** (0.0423)	-0.176*** (0.0346)	-0.110*** (0.0276)
Does not trust politicians	-0.0109 (0.0368)	-0.0212 (0.0368)	-0.0840** (0.0327)	-0.0220 (0.0255)
Large city	-0.116*** (0.0322)	-0.105*** (0.0326)	0.0727** (0.0306)	0.00178 (0.0243)
Finnish not first language	0.0223 (0.0753)	0.0352 (0.0754)	0.0307 (0.0709)	0.00686 (0.0631)
People can be trusted	-0.0402 (0.0344)	-0.0256 (0.0347)	0.0918*** (0.0335)	0.0332 (0.0275)
Disadvantaged	-0.0436 (0.0473)	-0.0437 (0.0473)	0.121*** (0.0453)	0.0702** (0.0355)
TikTok user			-0.0217 (0.0287)	-0.00432 (0.0227)
Constant	0.602*** (0.0320)	0.628*** (0.0335)	0.216*** (0.0336)	0.0548** (0.0261)
Observations	1,060	1,060	1,060	1,060
R-squared	0.051	0.059	0.125	0.437

Table 2: Predicting TikTok use and Liberal-left voting.


Note: OLS regressions for the youth sample (15 -29 years) for predicting TikTok usage (columns 1-2) and vote cast for the Liberal-Left bloc (columns 3-4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## 4.2 Conjoint results

The pre-registered conjoint analysis regarding the possibly different policy preferences of youth and adults presented in Figure 9 strikingly confirm the results of O’Grady (2023). For most part, the youth and adults have very similar policy preferences with the confidence intervals overlapping each others’ point estimates and point estimates being of similar magnitude. If there are any differences, the youth would be *less* inclined to vote for a party that would tighten taxation, thus conforming the liberal bias that O’Grady found, but at the same time the youth are also more inclined to vote for a party that would promote the 6-hour work day and decrease school class sizes. As lower taxation and smaller class sizes and less working hours are mutually exclusive given fiscal constraints, we might be able to interpret these contradicting stances as a lack of political sophistication on part of the youth, which is also evident in not engaging in much political talk at home or the unwillingness to identify as left-wing or right-wing or liberal and conservative.

The liberal/conservative value differences between the youth and adults are evident with the youth clearly being more in support of a party that would ban fur farming. The interesting conclusion is that young people in this way confirm somewhat the generational divide in values, but however, their most likely choice of party, the Finns’ Party is not a value liberal party. On the contrary, the Finns’ Party specializes in opposing immigration and there is no difference in the policy preferences regarding immigration between young people and adults.

Figure 9: Differences in average marginal component effects between youth and adults in supporting a political party that proposes any of the following policies:



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the AMCE and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

As there are no overall differences in policy preferences between adults and the youth, and if anything, the youth are overall more liberal than the adults, it is striking that they would so much more support the Finns' Party. As the Finns' Party is the most important political actor on TikTok, we can take this as meaning that some of the youth vote for the Finns' Party stems from Tiktok.

Of course in this interpretation we need to be careful with reverse causation: that young people who are already sympathetic to the message of the Finns' Party and eager to discover

their offer on TikTok self-select to be on TikTok. Therefore, we repeat the above analysis of average marginal component effects for policy preferences between TikTok users and non-TikTok users and find similar results.

Figure 10: Differences in average marginal component effects between TikTok users and others in supporting a political party that proposes any of the following policies:



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the AMCE and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

In sum, we find evidence for H1, that young people are more active on TikTok. Also, the fact that young people talk less about politics than adults would indicate that if they are on TikTok, that is the primary form of political information they receive.

We can also confirm H2 that young people by and large have similar policy preferences as

adults, and if anything are more liberal than adults.

However, in spite of this, we also find evidence for H3 that young people vote more for the populist right and the Greens than adults. Moreover, TikTok use strongly and robustly predicts voting for the populist right party. Furthermore, TikTok users policy stances are similar to those not in TikTok, and TikTok use is not dominantly predicted by the same characteristics as Finns' Party support, casting doubt on selection into TikTok driving the result.

Nonetheless, this paper has not been able to tap into the mechanism of why TikTok has influence. Do young people vote for the populist right and Greens mainly because they have managed to capture their attention on TikTok, or is this mainly due to the issue-congruence effect? After all, these parties might be better at formulating clear stances on issues that young people care about. More nuanced research should be done in the future to disentangle these mechanisms. However, on the whole young people seem to care about the same things as adults, and if there are differences they are more liberal than adults, yet, at the same time, their preferred party is the populist right that does not echo these liberal values. So in the very least we can speak of TikTok, if not being the primary reason for the association with the populist voting and the youth, is an important component of it.

## 4.3 Conjoint robustness analysis

### 4.3.1 Card order effects

One concern with reliability of the conjoint experiment results is that the respondents may subconsciously tend to be more likely to choose the left or right conjoint scenario regardless of the attribute values. To study this possibility, we run the AMCE regressions separately for the sub-samples of observations where the attributes were on the left and the right side. These results are shown in Figure [SI1](#) in the online appendix. The results for the left and right hand cards are practically identical indicating that the respondent paid attention to the attribute values rather than systematically choosing based on card order.

### 4.3.2 Carry-Over effects

Another concern in whether to trust the conjoint analysis results is the possibility that the respondent may not pay equal attention to answering the first questions as the subsequent questions. To analyze this possibility, we check the robustness with respect to the order number of the conjoint scenario. Figure [SI2](#) in the online appendix shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates by set number (1,2,...,8). The figure shows that the results are robust across the card pair order indicating that respondents maintained their attention throughout the choice tasks.

### 4.3.3 Robustness with respect to the row number

Finally, we test whether the order of the attributes matter, because it is possible that the respondent pays more attention to the attributes randomized to among the first ones. This robustness check is carried out by in turn creating a separate dummy for a given attribute and a question number. If the importance of the attribute does not depend on the randomized order, we would expect the point estimates for a given choice to be similar regardless of the randomized question number. As can be seen in Figures [SI3-SI10](#), the results are robust. That is, the confidence intervals for each attribute value estimates are largely overlapping across the row positions.

## 4.4 Conjoint heterogeneity analysis

In this subsection, we analysis the heterogeneity in AMCE in three dimensions. This is achieved by splitting the sample into two groups based on the dimension on interest. We include only the youth in these analyses. First, in Figure [11](#) we split the sample based on gender. We want to understand whether men and women have different policy preferences. This would be expected given they have different preferences for political parties as shown above. Second, in Figure [12](#), we compare the preferences of the Finns' Party voters with the other voters. This is to study further if the appeal of the Finns' Party among the young



(males) has anything to do with the party's policy platform.

Third, in Figure 13 we study differences in policy preferences between respondents with left and right orientation to understand whether differences in a classic policy dimension still exist among the youth and how that compares to a more recent cleavage of supporting the Finns' Party. This analysis also provides a further validity test of our analysis in the sense that several policy attributes have a clear left right tension that a good survey should be able to capture. Finally, we split the sample for the youth to the youngest in the sample, born between 2001 – 2008 and to older youth, born between 1994 and 2000. This is because our cohort is large enough to encompass young people of several cohorts who might be socialized into politics in different conditions and who are at different stages in their life. It could also be hypothesized that younger people are more radical and become more conservative as they age (Peterson et al., 2019) and that the younger a person is, the more the effect of social media influencers on vote choice. (Peter and Muth, 2023)

We find that differences between gender do not reflect economic concerns but are rather most salient when it comes to fur farming and immigration. Women would like to ban fur farming and allow work based immigration. Interestingly, these are the same attributes that show any differences between the Finns' Party voters and the rest. This further shows that the main gender based cleavage is the conservative nationalist men versus liberal women.

Differences between the left and right respondents are reflected in more attributes and present sensible differences in economic matters of taxation, unemployment benefits and working hours, but there are also differences in fur farming and immigration. This indicates that this traditional cleavage is alive and well also among the youth, contradicting their own statements on neither being leftist or right-wing and somewhat contradicting recent research showing that the youth would be shifting to more non-economic interpretations of the left/right divide. (Steiner, 2024; O'Grady, 2023)

The final split sample analysis regarding age reveals that there is only one difference between the older and younger youth, namely immigration attitudes. The younger sample

would be more likely to vote for a party that would increase work-related immigration than the older youth. This finding confirms our reading that if at all different from the older cohorts, younger citizens are more pro-immigration than the older cohorts. However, these cohorts are more prone to voting for the populist Finns' Party. This finding is in line with the findings of [Zagórski et al. \(2024\)](#) who find that Generation Z does not vote for populist parties for the "thick" aspects of it (anti-immigration) but rather for its thin aspects, which might be its anti-establishment message, the people centrality that populist candidates manage to portray on Instagram or the sheer presence of populist politicians on their preferred social media.


Moreover, these four figures together indicate that youth are still a very heterogeneous group and there are also differences within the group of young men and within young women.

## 4.5 Robustness of subgroup preferences

[Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) have proposed that that Average Marginal Component Effect is not ideal for capturing true subgroup differences in preferences because there may be (otherwise unobserved) differences in how subgroups value the baseline attribute. Instead, they suggest reporting the conditional marginal means for split samples. The marginal means estimate of an attribute indicates how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the profile. In figures [SI11](#): [SI16](#) in the Appendix we conduct our analysis by comparing the marginal means of attributes in various subgroups, namely for possible differences in preferences between the youth and adult samples, TikTok and non-TikTok users, younger youth and older youth, young males and females, youth who are Finns Party voters and who are not, and for youth with left and right wing orientations. These different analyses don't change the substantive interpretation of our previous findings according to which a) young people and adults don't differ overall in their policy preferences b) TikTok users don't differ overall in their policy preferences from non-TikTok users, younger youth, if anything, are only more pro-immigration than older youth, young women are more


liberal in their values than men, and that young Finns' Party voters are more conservative than the rest of the youth.

Figure 11: Differences in average marginal component effects between young men and women in supporting a political party that proposes any of the following policies:




Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the AMCE and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure 12: Differences in average marginal component effects between young Finns Party voters and the rest in supporting a political party that proposes any of the following policies:




Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the AMCE and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure 13: Differences in average marginal component effects between young with left versus right orientation in supporting a political party that proposes any of the following policies:



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the AMCE and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure 14: Differences in average marginal component effects between younger youth (born 2001 - 2008) and older youth (born 1994 - 2000) in supporting a political party that proposes any of the following policies:



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the AMCE and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

## 5 Conclusions and limitations

In recent years, especially during the 2024 EU elections there has been increased talk about young people, especially young men, turning to the populist right. This phenomenon has been explained by two alternative - or- complimentary reasons: that young people are concerned about different things than adults or that young people are using TikTok to inform themselves politically and to engage with politics.

To test these hypotheses we designed a study that explicitly measured possible policy preference differences between the youth and adults and a survey that asked about people's media consumption habits and political opinions. The results strongly suggest that whereas young and older people have largely similar policy preferences, confirming previous research (O'Grady, 2023), the differences in vote choice are strikingly different, with young people more likely to opt for the populist right, and secondarily for the Greens. For us this confirms the narrative of the youth voting for non-traditionalist parties and prioritizing rather the "thin" than "thick" aspects of populism Zagórski et al. (2024).

The biggest difference between younger and older citizens is that youth display lower levels of political trust and less inclination to discuss politics with anyone than adults. They are also reluctant to label themselves as either conservative/liberal and left-wing/right-wing which we interpret as either political indifference or lack of political sophistication. However, in spite of this reluctance to label themselves left/right, we have showed that also among the youth the left/right cleavage is alive and well and predicts both economic and non-economic policy preferences.

Instead, young people get active on TikTok where they are numerically more likely to be exposed to content created by the populist right in Europe and by Democrats in the US. As the Finnish political TikTok is dominated by the Finns' Party and secondarily by the Greens, it might not be a coincidence that the two largest parties among the youth are the Finns' Party and the Greens.

It is also noteworthy that not having a college degree is associated with TikTok usage, making it even more plausible that it is used by people with lower levels of political sophistication. A further surprising aspect is its ruralness, in the sense that living in a large city is negatively associated with TikTok. In the 2024 elections the Finns' Party made large gains in rural areas, so this association might be interesting to explore further in the future.

Traditionally family transmission of mainstream party support and political values and knowledge was the norm. In addition to family, the online platform has emerged as a

place where young people socialize into politics, although the more politically engaged and opinionated youth might self-select to TikTok. Although we have done our best to address this reverse causality issue, more nuanced research in the future should be done with regards to this. Additionally, this paper has not been able to assess the disinformation factor that is also crucial in connection with TikTok. In short, TikTok has emerged as a real market place of ideas, and some of that might seismically change the way future generations see and experience politics. This paper is just a first attempt to uncover the many patterns that can be discovered regarding this topic.



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# TikTok

## *Supporting Information*

December 16, 2024

# Contents

<b>A</b>	<b>The representativeness of the survey data</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>Robustness checks for the conjoint analysis</b>	<b>3</b>

## **A The representativeness of the survey data**

Tables A1-A3 (TBA) present information on the representativeness of the sample. Population data for Finland have been obtained from Statistics Finland. The Household Budget Survey aimed to provide a representative sample, but there are nevertheless some differences between our sample and the population as a whole. While the sample is fairly representative when it comes to age, gender and place of residence, our sample is tilted towards more highly educated respondents than the overall population.

In the case of education, the classification of our survey data and that of Statistics Finland's data differ, so we had to modify our own classification to try to match Statistics Finland's definition. This is likely to result in inaccuracies in the classification. In addition, Statistics Finland's data on education are only presented by five-year age group, and those aged 75 and over are classified as one category. In order to achieve a better correspondence between our sample and Statistics Finland's data on educational attainment in terms of age, we chose the age group 30-74 years for adults for the representativeness check on educational attainment. For the youth group, Statistics Finland's five-year classification corresponds to our own age group classification. Statistics Finland has only recorded the numbers of men and women. Therefore, in the gender analysis of Table A1 (TBA), we excluded six respondents who did not identify themselves as either male or female.

## B Robustness checks for the conjoint analysis

Figure S11: Card order effects




Figure SI2: Carryover effects




Figure SI3: Attribute order effects, flight tax






Figure SI4: Attribute order effects, fur farming




Figure SI5: Attribute order effects, income tax




Figure SI6: Attribute order effects, labour immigration




Figure SI7: Attribute order effects, retirement age




Figure SI8: Attribute order effects, school class size




Figure SI9: Attribute order effects, unemployment benefits




Figure SI10: Attribute order effects, working hours






Figure SI11: Robustness check as suggested by [Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) for subgroup differences between the youth sample and the adult sample, conditional marginal means



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the marginal means (how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the card profile) and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.




Figure SI12: Robustness check as suggested by [Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) for subgroup differences between the TikTok users and non-TikTok users, conditional marginal means




Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the marginal means (how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the card profile) and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure SI13: Robustness check as suggested by [Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) for subgroup differences between the younger youth sample and the older youth sample, conditional marginal means




Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the marginal means (how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the card profile) and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure SI14: Robustness check as suggested by [Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) for subgroup differences between males and females, conditional marginal means




Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the marginal means (how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the card profile) and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure SI15: Robustness check as suggested by [Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) for subgroup differences between the Finns' Party voters and non Finns' Party voters, conditional marginal means



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the marginal means (how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the card profile) and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Figure SI16: Robustness check as suggested by [Leeper et al. \(2020\)](#) for subgroup differences between left and right orientations, conditional marginal means



Note: Dots denote the point estimates of the marginal means (how likely the respondents choose a tender outcome conditional on the attribute appearing in the card profile) and lines their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.



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